If emissions are stochastic and firms are unable to control them through abatement, the cap in a permit market may be exceeded, or not be reached. I derive a binary options pricing formula that expresses the permit price as a function of the penalty for noncompliance and the probability of an exceeded cap under the assumption of no abatement. I apply my model to the EU ETS, where the rapid introduction of the market made it difficult for firms to adjust their production technology in time for phase 1. The model fits the data well, implying that the permit price was at least partly driven by firms hedging against stochastic emissions.
Introduction
The centerpiece of emissions permit market theory is that firms equate their marginal abatement costs with the permit price. If a firm finds abating an additional unit of emissions to be cheaper than buying a permit, it will make a profit from abating and either buy one fewer or sell one more permit on the market. Conversely, if purchasing a permit is cheaper than marginal abatement, the firm will use the permit market to reach compliance. The result of this arbitrage is that marginal abatement costs of all firms are equal to the permit price at every point in time.
However, a permit market may not clear if emissions are stochastic and there are constraints on abatement, banking and borrowing. The natural lower bound for abatement is zero: No firm is forced to actively increase its emissions in order to use up any surplus permits.
Therefore, if business-as-usual (BAU) emissions turn out to be below the cap and no banking into the next compliance period is allowed, some permits will not be used. Any upper bound on the permit price, for example in the form of a penalty for noncompliance, translates to an upper bound for abatement: If BAU emissions turn out to be greater than expected (for example due increased consumer demand) and no borrowing from the next compliance period is allowed, firms abate to the extent where their marginal abatement costs are equal to the penalty. The emissions cap will be exceeded because firms that do not hold enough permits to cover their emissions will choose to pay the penalty rather than engage in abatement.
In theory, firms can always reduce emissions by cutting output, but this may be costlier than paying the penalty. Some industries face obligations to provide a certain level of output.
An example is the electricity market where supply has to match (stochastic) consumer demand at all times in order for the grid not to crash, and the transmission system operator has the authority to force particular generators on-or offline to ensure continued grid functionality. Rather than dropping to zero immediately, the permit price remained at around €15 for another four months before gradually decreasing to zero by mid 2007. The market did in fact not clear for the first compliance phase, with 189 million permits or about 2.7 % of the overall cap expiring unused at the end of 2007 (no banking of permits into the second phase was allowed) despite a positive permit price during most of the time (Table 1 ). (Alberola et al., 2008; Bunn and Fezzi, 2008; Hintermann, 2010; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007; Rickels et al., 2007) . They find limited evidence that the permit price was driven by marginal abatement costs such as fuel prices, economic activity or of new production equipment often takes longer than a few years, most analysts concluded that fuel switching in the power sector (a shift of the generation merit order from coal towards gas) was going to be the predominant method of abatement for phase 1. On the other hand, electricity generators are typically locked into long-term fuel contracts, 1 which makes it difficult to engage in fuel switching on a meaningful level. In this paper set up a model in which firms are unable to control their emissions and buy permits in order to hedge against the possibility of having to pay a penalty. The permit price thus becomes a binary option that is a function of the probability that the emissions cap is exceeded and the penalty for noncompliance, but not of marginal abatement costs. I compute daily emissions based on daily generation of electricity from fossil fuels and use market data from the first phase of the EU ETS to estimate a set of free parameters. The parameter 1 These fuel contracts are often made for gate delivery in the form of take-or-pay, which makes it almost impossible to re-sell the fuel on the market. Because of limited storage capacity, generators are forced to use this fuel by bidding above (current) marginal costs.
estimates are highly significant and make economic sense, and the model fits the data well, especially when allowing for an updating of expectations at the time of the permit price crash.
Previous papers have addressed the issue of stochastic emissions and constraints on abatement (Chesney and Taschini, 2008) . However, the stochastic equilibrium models derived in these studies are too complex to be directly applied to data. The main contribution of my paper is therefore empirical. To my knowledge, it is the first to account for the possibility of a non-clearing permit market while allowing for a direct application of the model to market data.
In addition, I make use of an extremely detailed dataset about electricity consumption and precipitation across Europe that has not been employed in the empirical literature before.
My model represents a polar case where abatement is constrained to zero and the market is only influenced by expectations about aggregate stochastic emissions and the penalty of noncompliance. The other extreme of the spectrum is defined by the textbook situation where firms have full control over their emissions, and therefore the permit price is exclusively driven by marginal abatement costs. For phase 1 of the EU ETS, the reality is likely to be found somewhere in between: Some abatement probably took place (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008) , but the empirical evidence suggests that the permit price was not strongly related to marginal abatement costs. In fact, I find that a large portion of the permit price variation during phase 1 of the EU ETS can be explained without relying on abatement cost drivers at all. This has implications for efficiency, because the equality between marginal abatement costs and the permit price are a prerequisite for achieving an emissions cap at least cost.
Section 2 gives some background about the EU ETS and the relevant literature. In Section 3 I derive an options pricing formula for EU ETS allowances as a function of emissions, the cap, the penalty for noncompliance and a set of free parameters. This formula contains the mean and variance of expected future emissions, which I derive in Section 4 as a function of exogenous stochastic processes. Section 5 presents regression results for the parameters of underlying processes and the free parameters in the options pricing formula, and section 6 concludes.
Background

The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
The EU ETS is the world's largest emissions permit market to date and covers the EU's carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from six industrial sectors (Figure 2 ), among which power & heat accounts for about 72% of total emissions. The EU ETS is organized into distinct multiyear periods called "phases" that are subject to different rules and emission caps. The first phase spanned the years 2005-2007 and was considered a pilot run for phase 2, which coincides with the Kyoto compliance period of 2008-2 The Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) of the European Commission lists 9 sectors defined by "activity code", which are: Code 1: Combustion installations with thermal output of >20MW; 2: Mineral oil refineries; 3: Coke ovens; 4: Metal ore roasting or sintering; 5: Production of pig iron and steel; 6: Cement and lime; 7: Glass; 8: Ceramics; 9: Pulp and paper. For the grouping in figure 2, I aggregated codes 3-5 into "metals" and 7-8 into "glass and ceramics". For the other sectors, there is a one-to-one correspondence with activity codes. Within activity code 1, commercial power and heat producers for third parties account for 93% of emissions, whereas the remaining 7% come from numerous but relatively small installations involved in the production of on-site power and heat (so-called "autoproducers").
Power & Heat 72%
Metals 8%
Cement & lime 9%
Oil & Gas 7%
Glass & ceramics 2%
Pulp & Paper 2%
2012. First-phase allowances (one-time rights to emit one ton of CO2, denoted as EUA) could not be banked into the second phase and lost their value if unused for compliance. 3 About 12,000 individual installations received a total of 2.1 billion emission allowances annually, mostly at no cost. For a more detailed discussion of the market setup, see Kruger and Pizer (2004) and the PEW White Paper (2005).
Firms received allowances allocated mostly for, based on estimates of historic emissions.
Firms can trade allowances freely within the EU, either bilaterally, through brokers (over-thecounter or OTC trades) or on one of six exchanges. By April 30, they have to report their emissions and surrender permits corresponding to their emissions in the previous calendar year.
For every ton of emitted CO2 for which they do not surrender an allowance, firms have to pay a penalty (€40 in phase 1 and €100 in phase 2) as well as surrender the missing allowance in the following year. Because firms receive annual allowances in March they can effectively bank and borrow across time within a market phase, which implies that the penalty of noncompliance will only be applied at the end of a phase. Since allowance allocation exceeded emissions for phase 1, the penalty has not been applied to date.
Because of the lack of historic emissions data in Europe, many countries relied on firms' emissions forecasts when determining permit allocation, which introduced rather obvious incentive problems. There seems to be a general agreement among analysts that the first round of emissions accounting in April 2006 revealed lower-than-expected emissions, indicating that the cap was more generous than previously believed. The downward adjustment of market participants' expectations about aggregate emissions for phase 1 caused the allowance price to lose half of its value within a day. What is less evident than the reasons for the crash is why the price was so high in the first place, 4 and why it did not crash to zero but remained in a range of €15 for several months afterwards.
Another feature of the EU ETS that may be important in the context of this paper is the process for second-phase allocation, which took first-phase emissions into account. The
European Commission urged member countries not to engage in such "allocation updating", but most of them based their national allocation plans for phase 2 on verified 2005 emissions anyway. 5 Basing future allocation on current emissions creates a strong disincentive to abate, because every unit of abatement comes at a cost not only in the current period but also causes a reduction in future free allocation (Boehringer and Lange, 2005) . As a result, it is possible or even likely that firms stuck to their existing fuel contracts and merit order even if they had been able to engage in fuel switching (or any other form of abatement).
Literature
There is a large theoretical literature in environmental economics about permit trading, starting with the seminal work of Montgomery (1972) and Tietenberg (1985) . Later contributions extended the analysis to incorporate banking and borrowing of permits (Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse, 1996; Leiby and Rubin, 2001; Rubin, 1996) and to address uncertainty (Newell et al., 2005; Schennach, 2000; Zhao, 2003) . All of these studies show that it is optimal from a social and a firm perspective to equate marginal abatement costs to the permit price, and that this will lead to the achievement of an emissions reduction target at least cost. 4 If all firms with an allowance surplus brought them to the market, the price would incorporate information about aggregate BAU emissions and the resulting necessary abatement levels. The fact that the allowance price was positive during much of the first phase, in spite of an over-allocation indicates that the allowance price did not reflect all relevant information.
5 Although obviously problematic from a permit market point of, one has to consider the fact that most EU member countries had very little information about CO2 emissions. Given a grandfathering allocation method, it was very difficult for most countries to completely disregard the new information gained during the first year of the market.
Empirical studies about price determination in the EU ETS are inconclusive about whether observed allowance prices are indeed determined by marginal abatement costs. In one of the first empirical analyses of the market, Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) regress allowance price changes on changes in fuel prices and extreme weather conditions for the first year of the market (2005) and find some statistically significant coefficients with the expected sign, but the explanatory power of the model was quite weak. The most significant exogenous variable turned out to be the oil price, which is not an abatement-related measure (very little electricity is produced using oil in the EU, and neither the transportation nor the residential sectors are covered by the market), and the fuel switch price from coal to gas was not significant. Rickels et al. (2007) extend the analysis to 2006 and find some correspondence between allowance prices, fuel prices and European weather before the April 2006 price crash, but virtually none for the period afterwards. They also checked for cointegration between allowance and fuel prices, which would be evidence of a systematic relationship, but found none. In contrast, Bunn and Fezzi (2008) did find a cointegrating relationship between prices for allowances, gas and electricity, but the relationship between gas and allowance prices was weak and possibly due to the fact that both prices are related to electricity prices.
Hintermann ( Another strand of literature has looked at the issue from a mathematical finance perspective, focusing on the dynamics of allowance prices and methods to hedge against emissions-related risk. Kosobud et al. (2005) applied financial tools to the analysis of SO2 permits in the US Acid Rain program, and Paolella and Taschini (2008) examine the same market as well as the EU ETS. They find that allowance price returns are fat-tailed and thus are best modeled using models that take this property into account. However, they use a pure time series approach and do not aim to identify exogenous price drivers. In a similar approach, Benz and Trueck (2009) resulting EUA price dynamics. They prove that discounted allowance prices are martingales, meaning that they do not follow a seasonal pattern but immediately incorporate all relevant market information. The authors argue that the allowance price in their model will never reach zero before the end of the period because the stochastic nature of prices, emissions and abatement ensures a positive probability that the cap turns out to be binding and the penalty for noncompliance has to be paid, a result which also features in my model. Carmona et al. (2009) also develop a model in which allowance prices are driven by the probability of the cap to be exceeded, the cash part of the penalty for noncompliance (but not the second-phase allowances that also form part of the penalty) and fuel prices. They conclude with a numerical analysis based on a simplified model version where they use market data to calibrate emission and fuel price processes, although their setup does not allow them to incorporate daily data to update firms' expectations about future emissions. They find that their proxy for marginal abatement costs, namely the current cost to abate one ton of CO2 by fuel switching, is not highly correlated with the allowance price, supporting my assumption about the irrelevance of abatement during phase 1 of the EU ETS.
Model
Let t P be the closing price for an allowance on day t , with the index ) ,... The purchase of an allowance gives the bearer the option to use it for compliance at the end of the period or to sell it. However, if the cap turns out to be not binding, the bearer can retire the allowance. This makes an allowance a financial option, specifically a binary call option, also called a cash-or-nothing option, a point also made by Chesney and Taschini (2008) .
At time T the payoff from holding an allowance is:
(1) 0 0 0
The penalty of noncompliance P consists of a cash penalty of €40 plus the cost of buying an additional permit for the second phase. Let At t T < it is not known whether the cap will be exceeded, provided that it has not been exceeded already. The expected payoff from holding an allowance at time T is
denotes the probability density function over cumulative future CO2
E stands for the expectation taken using all information available at time t. The time subscript on the expectation about the penalty results from changing expectations about the second-phase price, which is relevant for the non-cash part of the penalty.
I specify emissions as a linear combination of normally distributed processes (see Section 4), which means that they are normally distributed as well. Options pricing formulae are usually based on log-normally distributed underlying assets, reflecting the idea that total returns are the multiplication of single-period returns. Cumulative emissions, however, are additive rather than multiplicative, and it is therefore appropriate to model them using a normal distribution. 
( )
Arbitrage considerations dictate that the price at time t be equal to the expected price at T, discounted by the risk-free rate of interest r. 8 Due to arbitrage considerations, the expected second-phase price at time T has to be the current forward price, scaled by the rate of interest, such that
Thus, the discounted expected allowance price at time T is 
The first parenthesis in (5) is the discounted total penalty for noncompliance per ton of uncovered emissions consisting of the cash penalty and a second-phase allowance. The term ( ) Φ ⋅ represents the probability that the cap is exceeded, which is unity for the second line.
Equation (5) is a binary options formula for the allowance price, with the underlying asset being normally distributed cumulative future emissions. What remains to be determined in order to evaluate (5) are past emissions (to compute t S ) and the mean and standard deviation of cumulative future emissions, t µ and t s . Daily emissions are not actually observed, but have to be derived from underlying processes and ultimately estimated using market data. This is the subject of the following section.
Mean and standard deviation of future emissions
Processes underlying CO2 emissions
There exist no data about daily CO2 emissions, but for the power and heat sector there is something that can serve as a substitute: Daily electricity consumption.
Electricity is special in the sense that demand has to be met with a matching supply at all times in order for the grid not to collapse. I assume that the short-term price elasticity of electricity consumption is zero, such that electricity supply is equal to demand, which in turn is a function of exogenous processes such as the weather and overall economic activity. 
where η is a fixed coefficient translating precipitation into hydroelectric power. Since precipitation can be stored to some extent, either in reservoirs or as snow in the mountains, there is no immediate relationship between precipitation and hydro generation on any given day. On the long run, however, all hydro generation is ultimately due to precipitation, and even if rainfall today may not translate into more generation today, it nevertheless reduces expected conventional generation needed to satisfy consumer electricity demand until the end of the phase. were applicable to infra-marginal generation as well. 14 Combining (6) and (8), emissions are a function of a set of parameters and the two stochastic exogenous processes t c and t h :
At time t, the mean of future CO2 emissions is defined by
The average emission intensity of inframarginal conventional generation can be greater or smaller than the emission intensity of marginal generation. For example, if inframarginal generation stems largely from lignite or anthracite coal power plants, then k>0 because these generators have a greater emission intensity than the marginal conventional generators which are predominantly hard coal and gas generators. On the other hand, if inframarginal generation contains a large share of combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), then k<0. In the EU, k>0 is more likely given the significant fraction of lignite generation in Germany and the new EU member countries from Eastern Europe.
The variance (for a derivation see Appendix) is (11)
Both expressions are functions of the constants n and η (which I treat as fixed), the parameters k and γ, and the mean, variance and covariance of electricity consumption and precipitation, the derivation of which is the subject of the next subsection.
Properties of the stochastic processes ct and ht
For the analysis of the stochastic processes that describe electricity demand and precipitation, I will draw extensively from a paper by Alaton et al. (2002) . Although they focus on pricing a weather option over heating-degree days, their analysis can also be applied to electricity demand and precipitation because both are exogenously driven stochastic processes that contain deterministic annual fluctuation and long-term trends. The contribution of my paper is not the derivation of the property of such processes, but the application of these methods to CO2 allowance pricing.
I model both electricity consumption and precipitation as diffusion processes consisting of a deterministic mean and a stochastic part, and which exhibit mean-reversion. For mathematical tractability, I include the stochastic element in the form of a generalized Wiener process. Combining the processes in the index , x c h = , they can be described as Using (13), we can compute the mean and variance of future electricity demand and precipitation. The expectation of the level of the process at time t, taken on day s, depends on the deviation of the current level from its long-term mean, as well as the expected long-term at 
If the volatility is constant across different calendar months, (18) reduces to (17).
Lastly, the covariance between electricity consumption and precipitation on days t and u for s ≤ t ≤ u is defined by (see Appendix): There is no reason to believe that consumption of electricity and precipitation on the same day should be systematically related, and the data confirm this. I therefore set [ , ] s t t
Cov c h = [ , ] s t u Cov c h = [ , ] 0 s t u
Cov h c = in eq. (11). Expressions (15) and (18)- (19) can now be substituted into (10) and (11), which in turn have to be substituted into (5).
Estimation
Estimation proceeds in two steps: First, I estimate the parameters 0 1 2 , , , , 
5.1.) Data
Allowance prices: Over-the-counter (OTC) closing allowance prices from Point Carbon. data. The 20 countries included in the analysis account for 99% of total production in the EU-25. The EU produces nearly all of the electricity it consumes, with net imports/exports accounting for less than 0.1 percent of overall consumption. I therefore set EU consumption equal to EU generation. In order to accommodate the variation in type and provenance of the data I will carry out the analyses separately for each group of countries for which the available data is of the same type and covers the same time period. The six groups are listed in Figure 4 for a subset of the sample period. Whereas it is difficult to visually discern a pattern in the raw data (Fig. 4a) , using moving 7-day-average (Fig. 4b) reveals a clear seasonality. ( )
The mean-reversion parameter x a measures the speed at which a shock to t x is felt at later times. From (15), the expectation of future electricity consumption or precipitation is (15), (18) and (19) Table 3 shows the first-stage parameter estimates. The correlation coefficients in Table 4 imply that electricity consumption across the six different regions is highly correlated. Based on these estimates I compute the mean, variance and covariance terms in eqs. (10-11).
Parameter estimation in the options formula
I now turn to estimating the remaining parameters in the options pricing formula.
Because emissions were below the total cap for the first phase as a whole as well as for each year individually, I disregard the second line of eq. (5). Substituting (10) and (11) into (5) while using (8) and simplifying gives 
At is the sum of past and expected future consumption of conventional electricity, whereas Bt is the standard deviation of future conventional generation. Conditional on the firststage parameter estimates, At and Bt can be treated as exogenous daily data. n/a n/a n/a -20.84 -3.51 0.66 n/a z n/a n/a n/a -22.31 -5.98 1.60 n/a Fr n/a n/a n/a -20.31 -13.98 1.01 n/a z n/a n/a n/a -20. n/a XNY n/a n/a n/a -86.72 -37.25 -11.54 n/a z n/a n/a n/a -20. Before proceeding to estimation I need to make two empirical adjustments to (25) price crash that these expectations were updated after the first round of emissions verifications.
As a second adjustment I therefore include an adjustment factor V EV multiplied by a dummy variable D t EV taking the value of zero before, and of one after the first round of emissions verifications. This leads to the following regression specification:
The parameter K represents the number of allowances available to firms in the power As an extension I allow the standard deviation of expected future electricity consumption to differ from t B , and further I consider the (very likely) possibility that firms updated this standard deviation after the permit price crash: The total cap 0 S is 6,300 Mt (million tons) CO2, or 2,100 Mt per year (see Table 1 To get an approximate estimate for Tk, I assume that lignite plants run continuously and are never at the margin, whereas marginal generation consists of a mix of gas and hard coal generation. The emission intensity of lignite exceeds the (weighted average) emission intensity of coal and gas generation by about is about 225 tCO2/GWh, and electric output from lignite is about 290,000 GWh per year (IEA data). This means that 2/3•Tk ≈ 2•225 t/GWh•290,000 GWh =130.5 Mt, which in turn implies that K ≈ 2,220 Mt. I use a range of 1,800 Mt ≤ K ≤ 2,600 Mt to account for the uncertainty embedded in this calculation.
The left panel in Table 5 shows the results from estimating (26) makes sense in the context of a market that was initially viewed to have a very stringent cap, but then turned out to have an allowance surplus of 89 Mt. 24 The range of the emission intensity γ of 607-876 tCO2/GWh is also plausible, considering that the emission intensity of gas and coal generators is about 420 and 960 t CO2/GWh, respectively, and that coal generators are in the majority in Europe. All estimates are statistically significant at p<0.001. The adjusted R 2 is very high, but due to the presence of the dummy variable this may not be a very meaningful measure. As an additional measure of model fit I employ the Cox-Snell generalized R 2 , defined by that is unexplained by the null model (Nagelkerke, 1991) . Thus, Model 1 accounts for 81 % of the allowance price variation that is unexplained by a model that only relies on pre-and postcrash intercepts.
The right panel of Table 5 an interpretation is conditional on the model being correct, and on market participants having access to the same information as presented in this study. Figure 5 shows the predicted price series computed using the estimates from the two specifications, along with the actual allowance price. Both predictions track the price reasonably well, although the more flexible second specification follows the EUA much closer.
Importantly, both models are able to explain a stabilization of the EUA price at a level significantly above zero after the price crash. This is because although the cap was seen to be generous after the first round of emissions verifications, there remained a nonzero probability 33 of higher-than-expected emissions in the future and therefore a chance that the cap would turn out to be binding in spite of the low 2005 emissions. 
Conclusions
In this paper I derive an expression for the allowance price during phase 1 based on the assumption that emissions are stochastic and firms are unable to abate. In this case, the value of an allowance is characterized by a pricing formula for a binary option that contains the penalty of noncompliance multiplied by the probability of a binding cap.
I estimate the model using data about daily electricity consumption and precipitation.
The parameter estimates of the options pricing formula are highly significant and make economic sense. The predicted allowance price series fits the observed prices well, especially when accounting for uncertainty embedded in emissions from other sectors and allowing firms' expectation of uncertainty to be updated after the first round of emissions verifications. The results imply that firms were hedging against the possibility of having to pay a penalty, and that uncertainty about future emissions may be a key allowance price driver. Importantly, the model is able to explain the price stabilization after the price crash, followed by a long and steady decline towards zero, which is due to a declining (but nonzero)
probability that the cap would unexpectedly turn out to be binding due to a late surge in emissions. Models based on the equality of allowance price and marginal abatement costs would only be able to explain such a movement if marginal abatement costs also expressed a steady decline towards the end of the market, a scenario for which there is no evidence in the empirical literature. This may be the reason for the generally poor performance of such models in explaining price drivers in the EU ETS.
Naturally, my results are contingent on the assumption of no abatement, which allowed me to derive a closed-form solution for the permit price and thus apply the pricing formula to market data. My model has to be understood as a polar case, whereas in reality some abatement probably did occur, especially while the allowance price remained high. If firms were partially able to control their emissions, the allowance price would presumably still exhibit some options features but at the same time incorporate drivers related to marginal abatement costs, in keeping with results reported by Carmona et al (2009) .
The accumulated evidence from empirical studies suggests that abatement was not the predominant price driver during the first phase of the EU ETS. Furthermore, considering that first-phase emissions were used to determine second-phase allocation, it is entirely possible that firms did not want to abate emissions, even if they were able to do so, which empirically amounts to the same thing. In this sense, the assumption of no abatement may not be unrealistic.
Equality between permit price and marginal abatement costs is a prerequisite for efficiency in any permit market, and in this sense once would conclude that phase 1 of the EU 
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